几十年来，加拿大自由党一直被誉为加拿大的“天然执政党”。这是一个中间派政党，而加拿大很少或从未出现过极端执政。但在过去一年里，自由党的得票率急剧下降。调查显示，自由党在全国范围内落后保守党 22 个百分点，甚至在魁北克以外地区落后新民主党 3 个百分点。这让很多人不禁要问：底线在哪里？
For decades, the Liberal Party of Canada has been described as Canada’s “natural governing party.” It’s a centrist party in a country that’s rarely, if ever, been governed from the extremes. But over the past year, the Liberal vote share has fallen off a cliff. The latest survey, has the Liberals 22 points behind the Conservatives nationally and even trailing the NDP by three points outside of Quebec. This has left many asking: where’s the bottom?
最新民意调查中，我们看到一些数字表明，自由党的选民人数正在减少。自由党在 2015 年获胜后不久，70% 的加拿大人表示他们会考虑投票给自由党。到 2019 年 11 月，这一比例下降到 51%。2021 年大选后，这一比例下降到 48%。如今，只有 37% 的加拿大人表示他们愿意投票给自由党。
In a latest polling, we see numbers that suggest the Liberal Party’s accessible voter pool is shrinking. Soon after the party won in 2015, 70 percent of Canadians said they would consider voting Liberal. By November 2019, that was down to 51 percent. Following the 2021 election, it fell to 48 percent. Today, just 37 percent of Canadians say they are open to voting Liberal.
这是自 2013 年贾斯汀·特鲁多 (Justin Trudeau) 成为自由党领袖以来，该党可获得的选民人数最少的一次。该党曾经拥有来自不同人口统计和地区的广泛选民群体，但现在却显得越来越集中和脆弱，甚至许多自认为是自由党的加拿大人也难以留住他们。
This is the smallest the party’s accessible voter pool has been since before Justin Trudeau became Liberal leader in 2013. What was once a broad tent of voters from various demographics and regions now appears increasingly concentrated and fragile, with the party struggling to hold onto even many Canadians who continue to self-identify as Liberal.
要了解“底层”是什么样子，我们必须了解自由党的基层。不管怎样，这群加拿大人的核心群体都会投票给自由党。
To understand what the “bottom” looks like, we have to understand the Liberal base. The core group of Canadians who vote Liberal no matter what.
让我们从 2024 年 9 月对 4,700 名加拿大成年人进行的最近两次全国调查的一些基本统计数据开始。
Let’s start with some basic stats from our last two national surveys conducted in September 2024 with 4,700 Canadian adults.
如今，24% 的加拿大人自认为是自由党人。相比之下，37% 的人自认为是保守党人，14% 的人自认为是新民主党人。但仅仅因为某人是自由党“支持者”并不意味着他们永远是自由党选民。举个例子：如今加拿大大约三分之一的自由党支持者目前不打算投票给自由党。这与我们在 2011 年联邦选举期间看到的现象类似。
Today, 24 percent of Canadians identify as Liberal. In comparison, 37 percent identify as Conservative and 14 percent identify as New Democrat. But just because someone is a Liberal “identifier” doesn’t mean they will always be a Liberal voter. Case in point: about one in three Liberal identifiers in Canada today are not committed to voting Liberal right now. This is a similar phenomenon to what we saw during the 2011 federal election.
如果我们进一步分析，核心选民——那些自称是自由党并且只会考虑投票给自由党的人——只占选民总数的 7%。相比之下，保守党选民基础几乎是该选民基础的三倍，为 20%，而新民主党选民基础不到该选民基础的一半，为 3%。
When we distill this further, the core base—the people who say they identify as Liberal and would only consider voting Liberal—represents just 7 percent of the electorate. For context, the Conservative base is nearly three times that size, at 20 percent, while the NDP base is under half the size at 3 percent.
这是一个重要的见解：2024 年自由党的选民基础并不比 2015 年大。尽管执政九年并三次获胜，但情况仍然如此。在此期间，该党的选民基础保持不变。相比之下，保守党的选民基础从 2015 年的 13%（可以说是保守党的最低点）增长到今天的 20%。
And this is an important insight: the Liberal base in 2024 is no larger than it was in 2015. This is despite nine years of governance and three election victories. Over that period, the base of the party has stayed static. In contrast, the Conservative base grew from 13 percent in 2015 (arguably a low point for the party) to 20 percent today.
那么，这7%是谁？
So, who are these 7 percent?
如今，自由党的选民基础以老年人为主——47% 的人年龄在 60 岁以上，只有 13% 的人年龄在 30 岁以下。考虑到该党在 2015 年激发的年轻人活力，这一结果令人惊讶，当时我们看到自由党年轻选民人数激增。新宣誓就职的总理特鲁多甚至任命自己为青年部长。自那以后，该党未能与加拿大千禧一代和 Z 世代建立长期、深厚的关系。
Today, the Liberal base is predominantly older—47 percent are over the age of 60, with only 13 percent under 30. This is surprising given the energy among young people the party created in 2015, where we saw a surge in young Liberal voters. A newly sworn-in Prime Minister Trudeau even appointed himself minister of youth. The party has since failed to establish a long-term, deep relationship with Canadian millennials and generation Z.
性别比例相当均衡，种族多样性与加拿大人口一样丰富，其中 21% 的人认为自己属于种族。
There’s a fairly even gender split, and the base is as racially diverse as the Canadian population, with 21 percent identifying as racialized.
从意识形态上看，自由党的支持者倾向于左翼，43% 的人认为自己属于左翼，44% 的人认为自己属于中间派，只有 13% 的人认为自己属于右翼。这种中间派倾向不仅反映了自由党的历史地位，也反映了中间派在加拿大选民中的主导地位。但支持者将自由党拉向左翼，同样，保守党的支持者也将保守党拉向右翼（60% 的保守党支持者认为自己属于右翼或中右翼）。
Ideologically, the Liberal base leans Left with 43 percent self-identifying to the left of the spectrum, 44 percent to the centre, and only 13 percent leaning Right. This centrist alignment reflects the historical position of the Liberal Party but also the predominance of the centre in the Canadian electorate overall. But the base pulls the party Left, in the same way, the Conservative base pulls that party to the Right (60 percent of the Conservative base self-identifies as Right or centre-Right).
从地理分布上看，自由党的支持者主要集中在安大略省和魁北克省。45% 的支持者居住在安大略省，34% 居住在魁北克省，这意味着几乎 80% 的自由党支持者都在这两个省——尽管这两个省的人口只占加拿大总人口的 60%。自由党在加拿大西部，尤其是阿尔伯塔省和萨斯喀彻温省几乎不存在影响力。
Geographically, the Liberal base is heavily concentrated in Ontario and Quebec. Forty-five percent of the base resides in Ontario and 34 percent in Quebec, meaning that almost 80 percent of Liberal supporters are in these two provinces—despite the fact that those provinces have just 60 percent of the population. The Liberals’ presence in Western Canada, particularly in Alberta and Saskatchewan, is virtually non-existent.
城乡差距也十分明显。自由党基础的 55% 居住在城市社区，而其余则分布在郊区和农村社区。城市人口集中度远高于一般人口，凸显了该党与加拿大郊区的脱节。
The urban-rural divide is also stark. Fifty-five percent of the Liberal base lives in urban communities, while only the rest is split between suburban and rural communities. This urban concentration is far higher than the general population, emphasizing the party’s disconnect from especially suburban Canada.
正如您所预料的那样，自由党基本盘仍然忠于特鲁多，79% 的人对他有正面印象，其中 34% 的人对他印象非常好。相比之下，只有 4% 的其他加拿大人持这种观点。
The Liberal base remains, as you’d expect, loyal to Trudeau, with 79 percent holding a positive impression of him, including 34 percent who are very positive. For comparison, only 4 percent of all other Canadians share this view.
与此同时，68% 的选民认为自由党应该连任，74% 的选民认为该党将赢得下届选举（只有 12% 的选民持相同观点）。这一群体的乐观情绪与广大选民对国家和该党前景的情绪形成了鲜明对比。
Meanwhile, 68 percent of the base believes the Liberals deserve to be re-elected, and 74 percent think the party will win the next election (a view shared by only 12 percent of everyone else). There’s an optimism among this group that stands in stark contrast to the broader electorate’s mood about the country and the prospects for the party.
由于这是该党的基层，很少有人有第二选择。61% 的自由党基层成员表示他们没有其他会考虑支持的政党，而 17% 的人会支持新民主党，10% 的人会考虑保守党。这说明他们忠诚的程度，但也表明基层成员缺乏党派灵活性。
Since this is the base of the party, few have a second-choice preference. Sixty-one percent of the Liberal base say they have no alternative party they’d consider supporting, while 17 percent would back the NDP and 10 percent would consider the Conservatives. This speaks to the depth of their loyalty, but also the lack of partisan flexibility within the base.
在这些问题上，自由党基础更有可能优先考虑气候变化，与其他人群相比，有 15% 的人将其列为首要问题。他们对国家的发展方向也更为乐观——58% 的人认为加拿大正朝着正确的方向前进，而其他所有人只有 23% 的人这样认为。
On the issues, the Liberal base is far more likely to prioritize climate change, with 15 percent more naming it as a top concern compared to the rest of the population. They are also more optimistic about the country’s direction—58 percent think Canada is headed in the right direction, compared to just 23 percent of everyone else.
那么，这一切对加拿大自由党意味着什么？
So, what does all of this mean for the Liberal Party of Canada?
首先，该党的下限极低，上限也极低。由于只有 7% 的选民构成了核心基础，自由党很容易像 2011 年那样崩溃。最近的民意调查显示，自由党和新民主党在统计上并列第二/第三，新民主党目前在魁北克以外的地区领先自由党三个百分点。这意味着 2025 年大选可能会与 2011 年的情况相似，如果自由党不能扩大其吸引力，他们将跌至第三位。
First, the party’s floor is now extremely low, and so is its ceiling. With only 7 percent of the electorate forming the core base, the Liberals are vulnerable to a collapse like the one they experienced in 2011. Our most recent poll shows the Liberals and NDP statistically tied for second/third, with the NDP now three points ahead of the Liberals outside Quebec. This means that the 2025 election could mirror 2011, with the Liberals relegated to third place if they can’t broaden their appeal.
其次，自由党基础的地理集中既是资产也是负债。虽然该党在安大略省和魁北克省占主导地位，但在其他地区却越来越不为人知。加拿大西部缺乏支持，再加上郊区和城市的差距，将使该党难以建立真正的全国联盟。这也给保守党带来了结构性优势，因为他们的基础不仅更大，而且地理分布也更加多样化，从而确保了稳定的支持基础。
Second, the geographical concentration of the Liberal base is both an asset and a liability. While the party dominates in Ontario and Quebec, it is increasingly invisible elsewhere. The lack of support in Western Canada, combined with the suburban-urban divide, will make it difficult for the party to build a truly national coalition. This also gives the Conservatives a structural advantage, as their base is both much larger and more geographically diverse, ensuring a stable floor of support.
第三，自由党的选民基础除了比一般民众年龄大之外，没有任何明显的人口统计学特征。相比之下，保守党的选民基础则更加明确：男性更多，来自农村，房主比例较高，并且包括大量从事贸易、自然资源或制造业的人员。
Third, the Liberal base lacks any strong demographic markers beyond being older than the general population. In contrast, the Conservative base is more distinctly defined: it’s more male, more rural, with a high proportion of homeowners, and includes a significant number of people working in trades, natural resources, or manufacturing sectors.
保守党内部的文化和社会经济背景更加明显。另一方面，自由党的基层更加分散，也更难确定。它没有表现出同样程度的人口或职业连贯性。相反，它的定义性特征似乎是它与政党本身或政党领袖的联系，没有基于共同经历或价值观的明确或一致的身份。
There’s a clearer cultural and socio-economic alignment within the Conservative base. On the other hand, the Liberal base is more diffuse and harder to pin down. It doesn’t exhibit the same degree of demographic or occupational coherence. Instead, its defining characteristic seems to be its connection to the party itself or the party leader, without a clear or consistent identity rooted in shared experiences or values.
最后，自由党面临的挑战反映了全球中间派政党面临的更广泛问题。杜瓦杰定律等政治学文献表明，中间派政党往往难以在有利于左右两派分歧的选举或政党制度中维持下去。在英国，随着阶级成为主要的政治分歧，选举权扩大，自由党被工党取代。在加拿大，语言和联邦主义与分离主义的分歧传统上决定了政治，使自由党得以蓬勃发展。但如今，这些分歧不那么明显，自由党发现自己没有一个明确的选民可以依靠。
Finally, the challenges facing the Liberal Party reflect broader issues facing centrist parties globally. Political science literature, such as Duverger’s Law, suggests that centrist parties often struggle to sustain themselves in electoral or party systems that favour a Left-Right divide. In the U.K., the Liberal Party was overtaken by Labour as class became the primary political cleavage and the franchise was expanded. In Canada, linguistic and federalist-separatist divides have traditionally defined politics, allowing the Liberal Party to thrive. But today, those divides are less salient, and the Liberals find themselves without a clear constituency to rely on.
如果没有强大、有凝聚力的核心支撑，自由党很容易被特殊利益集团或派系所接管。如果没有广泛的支持基础，无论谁接替特鲁多，都可能更多地受到对小众群体的狭隘吸引力的影响，而不是团结全党或面向广大加拿大人的愿景。自由党面临的挑战不仅是寻找新的领导人，而且是寻找一个能够抵制特殊利益集团的诱惑，同时重建更广泛、更有弹性的基础的人。
With no strong, cohesive core to anchor it, the party could easily be taken over by special interests or factions. Without a broad foundation of support, whoever steps into Trudeau’s shoes may be shaped more by narrow appeals to niche groups than by a vision that unites the party or speaks to a wide swath of Canadians. The challenge for the Liberals won’t just be finding a new leader, but finding one who can resist the pull of special interests while rebuilding a more expansive, resilient base.
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